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PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL ANTI-




At the time of their enactment, the Clean Water Act (CWA)' and the
Clean Air Act (CAA)2 were envisioned as statutory schemes permitting fed-
eral agencies and corps of local private attorneys general to work together to
conserve and enhance the country's air and water resources through admin-
istrative actions and private citizen suits. 3 Citizen suit enforcement has not
reached its potential to compel compliance with anti-pollution laws. Many
complex factors such as financing, sophisticated technology, standing, and
discovery present formidable barriers to potential plaintiffs. The need to dis-
tribute enforcement responsibilities between the public and private sectors,
however, remains undiminished. It is essential, therefore, that citizen suits
assume a vital role in the protection of the nation's air and water resources.
As the concept of citizen suits evolved in the 1970's, private enforcement
became the principal means for inducing the Environmental Protection
Agency to take regulatory or prosecutorial action under anti-pollution laws.
4
The incidence of reported private suits brought directly against polluters was
relatively small in both number and effect; fewer than twenty-five suits were
reported between 1970 and 1978 under the CWA and CAA.5 Despite the
plan by Congress to create a broad-based enforcement scheme, 6 the private
sector never has emerged as an effective auxiliary to EPA's enforcement
efforts.
The potential for private enforcement contributions expands and con-
tracts with shifting political fortunes. For example, under the present federal
* J.D. Georgetown University Law Center, 1983; Law Clerk to Chief Judge Anthony A.
Alaimo, Federal District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. The author would like to
express his gratitude to J. Gustave Speth for his inspiration and help with this article.
1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7601-7642 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
3. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (CWA's grant of authority to bring citizen
suits). Set also 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. V 1981) (similar enforcement mechanism in the CAA).
For case law application of citizen suits under the CWA, see City of Evansville v. Kentucky
Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008, 1014-17 (7th Cir. 1979).
4. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(suit to compel EPA promulgation of effluent limitation guidelines under the CWA).
5. Figure based on applicable statutes analyzed through LEXIS research system.
6. See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 79, repnted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3668. "The Committee has established a provision in the bill that would provide citizen
participation in the enforcement of control requirements and regulations .. " Id. at 3745. See
also Senate Debate on S. 4358, Sept. 21, 1970, repnnted in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DIVISION
OF CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, A Legislative Histoiy of The Clean Air Amendments of
1970, Vol. 1 (1974). "[Clitizens can be a useful instrument for detecting violations and bringing
them to the attention of the enforcement agencies and courts alike." Id. at 280 n.35.
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administration, EPA's enforcement programs have been substantially re-
structured because of agency budget reductions. Whereas the total EPA
budget for fiscal year 1981 was approximately $1.4 billion, the 1982 budget
was only $1.16 billion. 7 During debate over the 1983 fiscal year budget,
then EPA Director Anne Burford projected further reductions in agency
spending to approximately $975 million.8 It is estimated that these cuts
have reduced the actual spending power of the EPA by sixty percent in
1983, taking into account present rates of inflation.9 The effects of this
budget shrinkage are currently being felt. Agency staff has decreased from
10,381 employees to 8,340 for fiscal year 1983, and EPA staff enforcement
attorneys have been cut from 200 to just 30.10
Budgetary pressure is not the only cause of the EPA's reduced enforce-
ment of water and air quality laws; policy changes also influence enforce-
ment activity. For example, Congress has directed the EPA to focus its
attentions on the implementation of the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA)"I and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),'
2
which will demand a substantial part of the EPA's enforcement capabilities
for the next three years.1 3 The EPA has modified its enforcement policies in
other areas. The agency will no longer pursue cases solely for civil money
penalties. 14 Thus, although polluters substantially violate a federal pollu-
tion standard or emissions permit, the EPA will not bring actions against
them unless injunctive relief or cleanup steps are appropriate remedies. 5
The result of these budgetary pressures and policy modifications is a reduced
number of referral cases to the Department of Justice for enforcement pro-
ceedings. Approximately 100 cases were transferred to the Department of
Justice for prosecution in the first eighteen months of the Reagan
Administration. 16
Vigorous enforcement of anti-pollution laws in the future will depend
upon the initiative of private attorneys general. The purpose of this article is
to reexamine the concept of the citizen suit and evaluate its use as an en-
forcement tool. This process will involve three steps: 1) consideration of the
present law governing private suits against polluters; 2) discussion of the
practical difficulties facing the development of a widespread private move-
ment to enforce anti-pollution laws in the United States; and 3) examination
of one source of potential citizen enforcement litigation in CWA violations.
7. EPA Hard Hit By Budget Cuts, Sci. MAG., Oct. 16, 1981, at 306.
8. The 'Ice Queen'at EPA, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 19, 1981, at 67-68.
9. Pollution Is Our Most Important Product, NATION, Nov. 7, 1981, at 473-75.
10. EPA. Is Prodded Into Toxic Waste Rules, 68 A.B.A. J. 250, 250 (1982).
It. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
13. Interview with James Heenahan, Enforcement Attorney, EPA Region III, in Philadel-
phia (Mar. 19, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Heenahan Interview]; see also SCI. MAG., supra note 7,
at 306.
14. LEGAL TIMEs OF WASHINGTON, Nov. 30, 1981, at 1, col. 2.
15. Id.
16. This figure is approximated from information derived from NEWSWEEK, supra note 8,
at 67, and Washington Post, June 23, 1982, at A25, col. 3. As those articles reported, approxi-
mately 69 cases were referred to the Department of Justice from January 1981 through March
1982; 31 cases were referred from March to June 1982.
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II. PROCEDURAL STRUCTURE OF CITIZEN SUITS
The CAA established the statutory model for citizen suit provisions in
subsequent anti-pollution and substantive environmental protection stat-
utes. 17 These clauses provide liberal access to the courts and administrative
agency resources. Generally, any person may bring a suit based on a viola-
tion of a federal pollution law, regulation, or permit issued under that law. 18
By not requiring plaintiffs to allege an injury in fact to obtain standing,
Congress hoped to recruit citizens to serve as private attorneys general to
facilitate enforcement of statutes in the face of official inaction.19 An excep-
tion to this general standing rule was created in the CWA, which defines a
citizen as a "person or persons having an interest which is or may be adversely
affected." '20 Thus, standing to sue under the CWA is available to those per-
sons who qualify as plaintiffs under the standing criteria established in Sierra
Club v. Morton.2 ' Given the broad interpretation of Sierra Club applied in
recent citizen suits decisions, 22 this stricter standard for standing probably is
not a significant impediment to private suits.
Jurisdiction over citizen suits is vested exclusively in the federal
courts.23 Parties are thereby spared the need to establish diversity of parties
or a minimum claim for damages as required under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 or
other jurisdictional statutes. 24 Of course, jurisdiction over citizen actions
may be acquired through other laws such as the Administrative Procedure
Act,25 but, in general, violations of anti-pollution laws fall under the juris-
diction of the federal courts without resort to other statutes.
Notice requirements form the only limitation on the jurisdiction of the
courts to entertain citizen suits. Under each statute allowing private en-
forcement actions, private plaintiffs must notify interested parties, the gov-
ernment of the state where the alleged violation occurred, and the EPA
administrator of the contemplated action sixty days in advance of the suit's
17. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See also 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1976 & Supp. V
1981) (Toxic Substances Control Act); 16 U.S.C. § 1
5
40(g)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (Endan-
gered Species Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1515 (1976) (Deep Water Port Act); 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (1976)
(Noise Control Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6305 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (Energy Conservation Act).
18. Set, e.g., Metropolitan Washington Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 511
F.2d 809, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (general standing requirements relaxed for citizen suits).
19. Id.
20. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added).
21. 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (plaintiff required to allege facts showing he is adversely affected).
See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 701 nn.47-8 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Loveladies Property Owners Ass'n v. Raab, 430 F. Supp. 276, 280 (D. N.J. 1975) (appli-
cation of the Sierra Club o. Morton standing rule).
22. See O'Leary v. Moyer's Landfill, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 642 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Pymatuning
Water Shed Citizens for a Hygienic Environment v. Eaton, 506 F. Supp. 902 (W.D. Pa. 1980)
(suit to halt sewage discharges from municipal treatment plant).
23. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (CAA's liberal grant of federal
jurisdiction). See also 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The CWA states that "dis-
trict courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy or the citizen-
ship of the parties, to enforce such an effluent standard of limitation." Id.
24. 33 U.S.C. § 1356(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1976 & Supp. V
1981).
25. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See NRDC v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 83
(2d Cir. 1975).
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commencement in federal district court. 26 Notice provides the agency with
an opportunity to seek abatement of the violation through administrative
means.2 7 In NRDC v. Trainh,28 Judge Leaventhal agreed that the notice sec-
tion of the CWA's citizen suit provision was designed to give the EPA an
opportunity to act on the alleged violation, and the court should therefore
"stay its hand" when the administrator might be able to act informally and
obviate the need for litigation.
29
The EPA has authority to influence the polluter in various ways. For
example, under the CAA, the EPA administrator is empowered on the basis
of information available to him, to give a violator thirty days to comply with
the applicable standard. 30 If compliance is not achieved, the EPA may insti-
tute a civil suit or issue an administrative order to bring the pollution source
into compliance.3 The threat of such administrative action or the adminis-
trative order itself may alleviate the pollution problem without further
action.
Several exceptions to the sixty-day notice requirement are found in pol-
lution legislation and case law. Where targets of enforcement are discharg-
ers of hazardous substances, citizens may commence suit immediately; no
deferral period is imposed where there is threat of public injury.32 Another
exception to the notice requirement has been noted by at least two courts.
26. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (CWA's notice requirements for
citizen suits). Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619 F.2d
231, 243-44 (3d Cir. 1980) (60 day notice provisions were constructively satisfied).
27. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604(c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See also S. REP. No. 1196, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 35-6 (1970). The purpose of notifying the EPA of a potential suit against pollut-
ing parties was described by the Senate Committee which drafted the citizen suit clauses:
"Government initiative in seeking enforcement under the Clean Air Act has been restrained.
Authorizing citizens to bring suits for violations of standards should motivate governmental
agencies charged with the responsibility to bring enforcement and abatement proceedings." Id.
28. 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (a suit by private parties to compel the EPA to publish
effluent regulations as required under the law). Subsequent cases involving private actions
against polluters have upheld the notice requirement. Plaintiffs in Pymatuning Water Shed
Citizens v. Eaton, 506 F. Supp. 902 (W.D. Pa. 1980), were allowed to maintain an action
against the local municipal water treatment facilities which had failed to comply with their
permit, only after a showing that plaintiffs had given 60 days notice of the action to the EPA
and the Pennsylvania State Department of Environmental Resources. Id. at 907-08. Similarly,
in Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) the
Supreme Court affirmed the denial of jurisdiction to fishing groups seeking damages and other
remedies from local municipalities for alleged dumping of waste materials in violation of CWA.
Id. at 22. The plaintiffs had failed to notify government agencies of the prospective suit, ignor-
ing the 60 day prior notice requirement. Id. at 14. The Court emphasized that plaintiffs invok-
ing the citizen suit provisions "first must comply with specified procedures." Id.
See also Massachusetts v. United States Veterans Admin., 541 F.2d 119, 121-22 (1st Cir.
1976) (complaint for alleged CWA violations dismissed for failure to provide actual or construc-
tive notice); City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681,690 (7th Cir. 1975) (action brought
pursuant to CAA failed to satisfy 60 day notice requirement).
After plaintiffs in Metropolitan Washington Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Colum-
bia, 511 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975) failed to provide 60 days notice of the suit, they filed an
identical claim 60 days after the first unnoticed complaint in order to meet the requirements of
the CAA. Id. at 814.
29. Meb-opo/lan Washington Coalitton for Clean Air, 511 F.2d at 814.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1980) (allowing imme-
diate actions for violations involving toxic materials).
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Where administrative action would be inadequate to provide relief from the
violation alleged 33 or where the agency refuses to take any action against the
polluter,34 constructive notice of the suit will satisfy the statute. In effect,
constructive notice allows plaintiffs to commence their suit prior to the pas-
sage of the sixty-day notice period.
3 5
In addition to encouraging the EPA to take administrative action where
it would be beneficial to the public interest, notice of a citizen enforcement
suit allows the agency to intervene in the proceeding. 36 The EPA has the
statutory authority to intervene in any citizen action as a matter of right.
3 7
Agency intervention may have useful consequences for the plaintiffs' case.
Parties violating emissions standards or discharging beyond their permitted
levels are more inclined to cooperate with the EPA than with private plain-
tiffs during discovery proceedings or settlement negotiations. Another ad-
vantage of agency intervention is citizen access to EPA's extensive system of
information on all permittees and discharging entities in the region.
38
The EPA is under no obligation, however, to intervene in suits against
polluters initiated by citizens. 39 In fact, since it is the EPA's failure to obtain
compliance with the relevant pollution standard which initially creates the
need for citizen action, the agency may be reluctant to participate. Thus,
despite notification of the suit, EPA may decide to entrust the private attor-
ney general with responsibility for the enforcement action.
As stated in the amendments to the CAA, any person may commence a
civil action on his own behalf against any person "alleged to be in violation
of (A) an emission standard or limitation under this chapter or, (B) an order
issued by the Administrator or State with respect to such a standard or limi-
tation . . . ."40 Similar language is contained in other anti-pollution and
environmental protection laws.41 The courts consistently require that plain-
tiffs show a violation of a clear cut standard issued under the pertinent anti-
pollution law. For example, the defendants in O'Leag v. Moyer's Landfill,
Inc. ,42 were accused of recirculating hazardous leachate materials into their
33. See Massachusetts v. United States Veterans Admin., 541 F.2d 119, 121 (lst Cir. 1976)
(citing CWA's legislative history).
34. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1975)
(citing Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt., Inc. v. Secretary of Transp., 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974).
35. See generally supra notes 33-34.
36. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604(c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
37. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(c) (1976 &
Supp. V 1981).
38. Interview with Thomas Voltaggio, Division Chief, EPA Region III Compliance Divi-
sion, in Philadelphia (Mar. 19, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Voltaggio Interview]. See Friends of
the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1976). In this case the Second Circuit declared that
"the EPA's participation in a citizen enforcement suit is welcomed by the court, since the EPA,
as the agency vested by Congress with important overall responsibilities related to the matter
under consideration, possesses expertise which should enable it to make a major contribution."
Id. at 173.
39. Friends of the Earth v. Casey, 535 F.2d 165, 173 (2d Cir. 1976); Metropolitan Washing-
ton Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 511 F.2d 809, 814-15 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
41. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 491 l(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (Noise Control Act); 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (RCRA).
42. 523 F. Supp. 642 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
1983]
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privately operated landfill, allowing some 100,000 to 200,000 gallons of the
waste liquid to seep from the landfill into a nearby river every month. The
landfill's state operating permit, issued pursuant to the CWA, proscribed the
treatment of leachate near the fill, requiring instead that landfill operators
transport the material to the municipal sewage treatment facility.4 3 The
finding of a clear violation of the defendant's permit sustained an order for
the repair and cleanup of the landfill site.
44
A comparable suit against the North and South Shenango, Penn-
sylvania, municipal water treatment plant resulted in a court order to the
defendants to rectify their plumbing problems. The treatment system had
emitted sewage into the local river on numerous occasions. 45 The court
found a clear violation of the plant's permit. Defendants' assertion that the
underground sewage transport system was poorly constructed and negli-
gently installed provided no defense to the permit violation. 46 Because the
CWA required the treatment plant to utilize the "Best Practical Technol-
ogy" (BPT) to meet its permit discharge requirements, the court's order
mandated that a plan, to install the technology or repair the system, be sub-
mitted to the court within ninety days of the order.
4 7
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals further clarified the types of vio-
lations that are actionable under citizen suit provisions in City ofEvansville v.
Kentucky Liquid Recychng, Inc. 48 Plaintiffs brought suit claiming that defend-
ants had discharged toxic chemicals into the sewage treatment system,
thereby contaminating the Ohio River and the local water supply. 49 In ad-
dition to problems of insufficient notice and standing, which were addressed
by the court, the Seventh Circuit found that plaintiffs had failed to raise a
proper claim under the Act. Because plaintiffs had sought compensatory
damages for past acts violating CWA guidelines,50 the court held that the
statute authorizing civil action against a party "alleged to be in violation" of
effluent standards was not applicable. 5 1 To the extent that plaintiffs alleged
only past violations, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim.
The Evansville plaintiffs failed to seek remedies satisfying the statute.
Had they sought an injunction on the grounds that the defendants' past acts
indicated a pattern of behavior that was likely to lead to future violations,
the court may have granted relief. The parties in O'Leag v. Moyer's Landfill,
Inc. ,52 on the other hand, succeeded under similar facts, by showing that
defendants' discharges in excess of the permitted levels had occurred on a
regular basis in the past, and that defendants had taken no more than stop-
gap measures to remedy the violations. 53 By showing that the violations
43. Id. at 651-53.
44. Id. at 659.
45. P)'atuning Water Shed, 506 F. Supp. 902 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
46. Id. at 909.
47. Id.
48. 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979) (citizens suit brought under the CWA).
49. Id. at 1010.
50. Id. at 1014.
51. Id.
52. 523 F. Supp. 642 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
53. Id. at 652-53.
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were likely to continue, plaintiffs provided the court with an adequate basis
to grant injunctive relief.
54
III. REMEDIES AVAILABLE IN CITIZEN SUITS
Private enforcement actions provide a number of remedial options for
pollution law violations. Injunctive relief is a common remedy awarded to
successful plaintiffs in citizen enforcement actions. Private suits may enforce
anti-pollution laws by obtaining court-ordered compliance with the applica-
ble standard or limitation. This compliance order may take the form of pro-
hibitory or mandatory injunctive relief.5 5 Secondly, where appropriate
remedies are not readily identifiable, the court may rely on its equitable au-
thority to require a polluter to submit a plan describing the steps he will take
to attain compliance with the standard violated. 56 This was the course
taken by the court in PImatumn)g Water Shed.5 7 The technological problems
involved in repairing defendant's water treatment facility plumbing were
not sufficiently understood by the court that immediate compliance could be
demanded; but the court did require, in cooperation with the state and the
EPA, preparation of a plan for compliance within a reasonable time.
58
A third remedial category is civil penalty. Requests for civil penalties
are not often granted, though they are appropriately requested under the
CWA.59 In many cases, courts consider that the penalty money would be
more wisely invested in the effort to attain compliance rather than in puni-
tive sanctions.6° The judiciary may be reluctant to allow private citizens to
bring cases seeking quasi-criminal sanctions in the form of civil fines for pol-
lution violations. Although Congress sought to create private attorneys gen-
eral under anti-pollution laws, the spirit of citizen enforcement actions casts
plaintiffs in the role of protectors of their immediate environment, rather
than in the role of society's corporate watchdogs. 6 1 Pursuit of penalties
against violators is more appropriate as an agency function.
62
Another reason for judicial unwillingness to award civil penalties is the
statutory reservation to plaintiffs of private common law causes of action.
63
54. Id. at 659.
55. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See also National Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (establishing timetable for defend-
ants to comply with CAA).
56. Pmatuning Water Shed, 506 F. Supp. 902 (W.D. Pa. 1980); see supra text accompanying
notes 45-47.
57. 506 F. Supp. 902 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
58. Id. at 909.
59. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
60. See O'Leary, 523 F. Supp. at 659.
61. Volhaggio Interview, supra note 38.
62. Id.
63. Citizen suit provisions in CWA and CAA create no implied private cause of action as
has been held to exist in other federal statutes. See generaly Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
Implied actions were discussed by the Court in Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National
Sea Clamrnmers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1982). The structure of the CWR and its "legislative history
both lead us to conclude that Congress intended that private remedies in addition to those
expressly provided should not be implied. Where, as here, Congress has made clear that im-
plied private actions are not contemplated, the courts are not authorized to ignore this legisla-
tive judgment." Id. at 18. Citizen suit clauses, however, do specifically reserve for plaintiffs any
19831
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Thus, citizens may pursue damages emanating from the violation in a sepa-
rate action. The availability to plaintiffs of these civil remedies may affect
the inclination of courts to impose penalties on polluters.
IV. ATTORNEYS FEES
Although plaintiffs rarely recover damages under citizen suit enabling
clauses, private attorneys general are eligible for attorneys fees. All citizen
suit clauses in anti-pollution laws provide for the award of attorneys fees to
"any party, whenever the court determines that such an award is appropri-
ate." 64 Recent judicial discussion of attorneys fees clauses has affirmed the
viability of fee awards before the courts.
In Sierra Club v. Gorsuch ,65 the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia awarded attorneys fees to the Sierra Club and co-plaintiff Environ-
mental Defense Fund (EDF), despite the fact that plaintiffs did not
substantially prevail in their suit challenging regulations controlling sulfur
dioxide and particulate emissions, promulgated by the EPA under the
CAA.
6 6 In its two-pronged analysis the court first considered whether the
questions raised by plaintiffs in the course of the suit were significant. Sec-
ond, the court evaluated whether the plaintiffs substantially assisted the
court in its consideration of the important questions raised. 67 The contro-
versy before the court also presented the first major judicial review of the
rulemaking procedures adopted in the 1977 amendments to the CAA.
6 8
At trial, plaintiffs had alerted the court to several crucial issues regard-
ing EPA's rulemaking procedure for the challenged rule.69 In addition,
counsel for the EDF and the Sierra Club compiled extensive legislative his-
tory and factual background for the specific amendments under review, not
only enriching the court's understanding of the issues but also saving the
court time in its deliberations. 70 The award of fees was justified by the court
on the grounds that the plaintiffs did substantially contribute to the goals of
the Act:
the issues they addressed were important, complex and novel; their
assistance in the resolution of the issues was substantial and not
duplicative of the efforts of other parties; and the caliber of their
written and oral presentations was exemplary. While the occasions
upon which non-prevailing parties will meet such criteria may be
exceptional [cite omitted], Sierra Club is such an occasion. 7
Contrary to the general rule that parties bear their own litigation ex-
other common law actions they might have. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1976 & Supp. V
1981).
64. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1976 &
Supp. V 1981).
65. 672 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 254 (1982).
66. 672 F.2d at 34.
67. Id. at 39-42.
68. Id. at 40.
69. Id. at 40-41.
70. Id. at 41.
71. Id. at 39.
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penses regardless of the suit's outcome,72 the decision in Sierra Club v. Gorsuch
is the latest in a line of cases that have established the principles of fee
awards to parties who seek to enforce federal anti-pollution laws through
private suits.73 Because courts have recognized that awards of attorneys fees
provide a major incentive for parties to undertake public interest litigation,
it is not surprising that Congress voted to codify this socially utilitarian prac-
tice into environmental statutes.
The rationale for attorneys fees awards in citizen suits is not the reim-
bursement of the party "wronged" in the litigation. 74 Theoretically,
whether a party prevails in a suit brought to enforce anti-pollution laws is
inconsequential in determining the award of fees:
[T]he purposes of the authority to award fees are not only to
discourage frivolous litigation, but also to encourage litigation
which will assure proper implementation and admtm'stration of the act or
otherwise serve the public interest. The committee did not intend
that the court's discretion to award fees under this provision should
be restricted to cases in which the party seeking fees was the "pre-
vailing party." In fact, such amendment was expressly rejected by
the committee, largely on the grounds set forth in NRDCv. EPA .75
The phrase "proper implementation and administration of the act"
' 7 6
has been interpreted narrowly by the courts. 7 7 Only cases brought under the
jurisdiction of the citizen suit clause itself may qualify for fee awards; suits
brought to remedy actions illegal under the act, but nonetheless not included
in those violations of effluent or emission standards or limitations, are subject
to the historical prohibition against fee awards. 78 Thus, where suits are
properly commenced to enforce emission standards or similar anti-pollution
limitations under the laws which provide for citizen action, prevailing plain-
tiffs are entitled to receive fee awards from defendant polluters. Courts
award fees or request parties to negotiate a proper fee settlement consistent
with the terms of the act and subject to the approval of the court.
79
In Alabama Power Co. v. Corsuch ,80 a companion case to Sierra Club, the
court addressed, among other issues, whether environmental groups, which
had intervened on behalf of the EPA, were entitled to an award of attorneys
fees under the CAA. 8' EPA opposed the award of attorneys fees, asserting
72. Seegenerally Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
73. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir.
1973); Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Natural Resources, 512 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Haw. 1981); Save
Our Sound Fisheries Ass'n v. Callaway, 429 F. Supp. 1136 (D. R.I. 1977); Citizens Ass'n v.
Washington, 383 F. Supp. 136 (D. D.C. 1974), rev'don other grounds, 535 F.2d 1318 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
74. See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 79, repnhtedin 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3668, 3747.
75. H. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 337, reprted tn 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1077, 1416 (emphasis added).
76. Id.
77. Save Our Sound Fisheries Ass'n v. Callaway, 429 F. Supp. 1136 (D. R.I. 1977).
78. Id. at 1141.
79. See, e.g., Pymatunrng Water Shed, 506 F. Supp. at 909; Sierra Club, 672 F.2d at 42.
80. 672 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1982).
81. Id. at 4.
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that the intervenors had duplicated the EPA's efforts. The court held that
the Sierra Club and the Environmental Defense Fund in their role as inter-
venors had "not demonstrated with any sort of particularity that their inter-
vention added in any essential way to EPA's stance on the issues involved, '82
and therefore, the court denied that portion of the award for attorneys fees
associated with the environmental groups' intervention.
The calculation of attorneys fees has been standardized under most fed-
eral attorney fee shifting schemes. 83 To encourage competent attorneys to
undertake public interest representation, the court must compensate attor-
neys sufficiently for the work they perform.84 The measurement for compu-
tation of fees is a "reasonable hourly rate" multiplied by the number of
hours expended on the law suit. 85 On its face this formula appears simple,
but complications have surfaced in its application by the courts. Many
courts have been unwilling to accept the actual number of hours spent on a
case as the basis for calculating reasonable fees. The court in Copeland v.
Marshall,8 6 asserted that "no compensation is due for nonproductive
time." 8 7 Thus, where multiple attorneys are assigned to duties that the court
finds could have been handled by a single attorney, under Copeland the court
would deny fees for those hours billed by the extra lawyers. Only the hours
necessary for the task, in the court's estimation, would be compensable.
The hourly rate should be the prevailing rate in the community for
similar work performed.8 8 That rate is a product of the level of skill required
by the suit, the importance or risk posed by the litigation, and the attorney's
reputation and ability.89 Although the hourly rate emerging from this
calculus has consistently approached fair market value for the services of the
attorneys in the case, 9° some courts tend to discount fee rates to public inter-
est attorneys. 9' These courts opine that attorneys who litigate public interest
claims should not expect remuneration, but rather servepro bono under their
82. Id. The court did, however, grant these environmental groups' attorneys fees in their
role as petitioners and in the situation where the court specifically requested one of the interven-
ors to address an issue. Id.
83. Seegenerally Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 672 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Lindy
Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiation and Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.
1973). These cases measure attorneys' fees by market value. Cf Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp.
403 (C.D. Cal. 1980). The court calculated fees to prevailing plaintiffs based on market value,
but added a 3.5 multiplier to compensate counsel for their meritorious services in a complex
environmental case. Id. at 574-77.
84. Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (award of attorneys' fees in a
Title VII action). In Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 672 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the
Court of Appeals adopted the Copeland fee calculus in the environmental context.
85. Copeland, 641 F.2d at 891.
86. 641 F.2d 880.
87. Id. at 891.
88. See Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 672 F.2d at 50-61 (extensive discussion of fee
awards calculation).
89. Id. at 52 (citing Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiation and Standard Sani-
tary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 1973)).
90. See Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 672 F.2d at 58 n. 11; Keith v. Volpe, 501 F.
Supp. at 412-13.
91. See Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys Fees: What is Reasonable?, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 281,
310-11 (1977).
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professional obligation to perform community service.9 2 Nevertheless, many
courts utilize the formula set out in Copeland, instructing parties to develop a
fee settlement based on those criteria.
93
Fee awards are also available to the alleged violators in environmental
citizen suits where frivolous or bad faith claims are shown. Although actual
awards of such fees have not been reported in any case, potential plaintiffs
should be aware that fee awards are available to defendants under the stan-
dard "American Rule," which allows a court to make an award of fees to
parties victimized by bad faith or frivolous claims.
94
It is noteworthy that while the prevailing standards for attorney fee
awards are fairly liberal toward plaintiffs, the Supreme Court recently
granted certiorari in Sierra Club o. Gorsuch .9- The Court's pending scrutiny of
Sierra Club's "award where appropriate" analysis has raised speculation that
attorneys fees may not be as broadly accepted by the Court on review.
96
The development of the law governing citizen suits to enforce anti-pol-
lution laws has resulted in a favorable climate for litigation. Jurisdiction
and standing limitations present no major restrictions on citizen suits, 9 7 pro-
viding plaintiffs meet rudimentary notice requirements. The major proce-
dural impediment has been plaintiffs' strategic error in seeking personal
damages instead of remedies to abate defendants' prohibited activity. 98 It is
clear that causes of action created by environmental laws are for the public
benefit; therefore, the selection of remedies should be tailored to that end in
order to state a proper cause of action.
Recent court decisions regarding awards of attorneys fees encourage
plaintiffs in citizen enforcement suits. The District of Columbia Circuit's
adoption of the "substantial contribution" theory of awarding fees to public
interest litigants,99 would seem to indicate that prevailing plaintiffs, in par-
ticular, have a strong claim to fees because their suits generally will advance
the purposes of the statute at issue. In addition, the language of Sierra Club o.
Gorsuch suggests that in cases focusing on national policy issues, non-prevail-
ing plaintiffs stand a better chance of obtaining some fees from successful
defendants than do those plaintiffs in smaller, locally oriented cases. to0
92. Id. at 311. See, e.g., Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp.
1233, 1253 (D. Kan. 1974).
93. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 672 F.2d at 50-61.
94. For an overview of the development of attorney fee awards in American law and the
introduction of statutorily authorized awards, see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness
Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
95. 672 F.2d at 33.
96. The Department of Justice argued in its petition for certiorari in Sierra Club v. Gorsuch
that awards of attorneys fees to losing plaintiffs in suits against the government impose a major
burden on government efforts, by encouraging "unproductive, expensive and time consuming
litigation." Note, Awards of Attorneys' Fees to Unsuccessful Environmental Litigants, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 677, 687 n.56 (1983) (quoting Petition for Certiorari at 8, Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672
F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 254 (1982).
97. The CWA contains a stricter standing requirement. See supra text accompanying notes
20-25.
98. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 64-80.
100. Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d at 39-40.
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Because the basic legal landscape appears amenable to private enforce-
ment of federal anti-pollution laws, the paucity of such actions must result
from non-procedural factors.
V. THE SCARCITY OF CITIZEN SUITS
Examination of available case law suggests a number of reasons why
citizen suits to enforce anti-pollution laws have been relatively scarce. Many
violations are not readily apparent to the inhabitant of an area affected by
illegal air and water pollution; violations do not often announce themselves
in easily perceived forms. While some cases arise where citizens observe a
visible change in the color or odor of a river, see a shift in the color or quality
of industrial smokestack exhaust, or experience personal injury from contam-
inated drinking water or failing crops, most violations are not so evident.
Nevertheless, inconspicuous deviations from emissions and discharge stan-
dards may have significant impacts on water and air quality.
A second reason for the rare use of private enforcement is the highly
complex, scientific nature of many environmental regulations.' 0 1 Average
citizens may not have the ability or willingness to engage in the educational
process required to understand and effectively enforce environmental quality
standards.
Even where lack of knowledge is no barrier to a citizen suit, economic
disincentives may stifle the prospective plaintiffs' initiative. Actual costs of a
suit vary with the facts of the case; however, in the simplest case, filing of
charges and motions with the court, discovery efforts, and the assembly of
expert witnesses requires some financial resources "up front." The expecta-
tion that plaintiffs may be reimbursed by the court through an award of fees
does not remove the immediate burden of such expenses.
10 2
Other financial disincentives discourage citizen suits. Several citizens'
suits to date have been brought in pursuit of compensation for personal inju-
ries received allegedly from the illegal pollution caused by the defendant;
10 3
but, since private enforcement precludes recovery of damages, plaintiffs are
deprived of a powerful, personal motive to sue. In addition, citizens must
consider the economic risk of liability for defendants' attorneys fees. Though
these awards are rare, the fear of having to pay one's adversary's legal costs
may dissuade citizens from bringing suit.
Situations conducive to private enforcement action usually involve ob-
vious regulatory violations resulting in public harm, such as a river foaming
due to toxic discharges of a tanning company or the silting of a local creek
by a coal mining operation. But such patent violations are also likely to be
the subject of EPA or state enforcement actions. It is, therefore, arguable
that a portion of citizen enforcement activity in the last decade has been
preempted by some form of agency action.
101. Se. 40 C.F.R. §§ 129-36 (1982) (examples of the complex nature of chemical
regulations).
102. Heenahan Interview, supra note 13.
103. See generally City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th
Cir. 1979); Yates v. Coal Creek Co., 485 F. Supp. 995 (D. W.Va. 1980).
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Agency action taken in the sixty-day notice period may also limit the
number of citizen suits that actually reach the litigation stage. Because an
agency letter or conference with the polluter often achieves corrective ac-
tion,' 0 4 citizen suits perform their intended role: to awaken government en-
forcement machinery.' 0 5 Nevertheless, at the point where a citizen gives
notice to the EPA of his intended suit, he may have expended considerable
energy and resources. EPA action during the deferral stage renders those
efforts non-compensable because fees are available only to litigants. Thus,
citizens may be discouraged from bringing suits if they anticipate being pre-
empted by agency action.
No one of these problems facing citizen plaintiffs may be cited as the
primary cause for the scarcity of private enforcement actions. In combina-
tion, however, they present major barriers to the participation of private par-
ties in the implementation of water and air quality statutes.
The remaining section of this paper proposes a model for citizen en-
forcement suits, focusing on the CWA as a potential arena for increased citi-
zen suit participation.
VI. A MODEL FOR PRIVATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL ACTIONS
One of the major impediments to citizen participation in the enforce-
ment of anti-pollution standards has been the difficulty, both perceived and
real, of collecting sufficient factual evidence on which to base citizen enforce-
ment suits. 10 6 Several factors contribute to this problem including the com-
plexity of pollution standards, the specialized technology often required to
discover violations of regulations, and the cost of acquiring data. During the
initial years of anti-pollution legislation, citizens were on their own to collect
necessary information; but as state and federal administration of those laws
developed, a number of agencies have created substantial resource systems
from which private citizens can draw information to support their enforce-
ment efforts. 1
0 7
The machinery created for the administration of anti-pollution laws is
illustrative of the government resources presently available to citizens. The
EPA is divided into geographic regions, each administered by an office con-
taining an enforcement division and a compliance division.' 08 These re-
gional offices are responsible for: 1) the collection of compliance data from
all parties governed by federal pollution laws and regulations; 2) the coordi-
nation of the enforcement efforts of the state environmental programs with
the region; and 3) the screening and development of desirable enforcement
actions, which are forwarded to the EPA headquarters in Washington, D.C.
for approval and reference to the Department of Justice.' 0 9




108. Interview with Anne Pyzick, Report Manager, EPA Region III NPDES Compliance
Division, in Philadelphia (Mar. 19, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Pyzick Interview].
109. Voltaggio Interview, supra note 38.
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Each region has developed its own reporting and compliance evaluation
system," 1 0 tailored to the needs of the federal jurisdiction in the area and the
memoranda of agreement signed with the delegated states in the region.
Delegated states have elected to accept primary responsibility for enforce-
ment of water quality standards subject to EPA review."'I These states issue
permits to parties who are subject to emission and discharge regulations, col-
lect monthly discharge reports from permittees, and seek compliance with
limitations or standards through administrative or civil actions. 112 Dele-
gated states must report to the EPA regional administration any compliance
information as specified in the memorandum of agreement for that state. By
contrast, in non-delegated states the EPA compiles all compliance informa-
tion and carries out enforcement actions.' 13
EPA Region III offers a good example of a reporting system under the
CWA. The principal reporting document is the National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System (NPDES) permit, which describes the specific
limitations under which the permittee must operate."t 4 In order to ascertain
whether those limitations are being complied with, the NPDES permit typi-
cally requires the permittee to file a monthly discharge monitoring report
(DMR).1 5 The DMR requires three categories of information.
1) Permitted Discharge Levels. Each permittee is permitted to dis-
charge amounts of various effluent matter, measured both by total volume of
discharge and by the concentration of effluent in the water receiving the
discharge. The limitations circumscribe safe levels of discharge of chemical
compounds, total suspended solid materials, and other water quality meas-
ures such as water acid content, biochemical oxygen, and water color. The
DMR also locates the permittee and the specific body of water receiving
discharges.
2) Method of Discharge Analysis. As specified in the NPDES permit,
effluent discharges are measured by the permittee utilizing various testing
methods. Sampling is done one of two ways: "composite sample," a combi-
nation of individual samples taken at regular intervals proportional to the
discharge flow rate, or in volumes proportional to the total flow; or a "grab
sample," an individual sample taken to spot check the water quality and
content. By multiplying the proportional content of the sample by the total
flow, which is also a regulated quantity, a permittee computes total output
levels of the effluents. Most effluent discharges are regulated by average as
well as by minimum/maximum output level.
3) Actual Discharge Levels. These are the actual figures which de-
scribe the permittee's discharge activity for the reported month, the results of
the permittee's mandatory sampling under the NPDES permit."
16
110. Pyzick Interview, supra note 108.
111. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1316-19 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
112. Pyzick Interview, supra note 108.
113. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 109-10.
114. 40 C.F.R. § 122.18 (1982) established reporting requirements under the CWA.
115. 40 C.F.R. § 122.7() (1982).
116. All information regarding DMRs was gathered through Freedom of Information Act
requests. See also Pyzick Interview, supra note 108; interview with John Hundertmark, Engineer,
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Immediately available to the public once filed with the regional office,
DMRs are not difficult to interpret. Substantial violations by the permittee
may be identified by comparing the discharge level reported with the per-
mitted level of effluent output. The gravity of a violation, however, may be
burdensome to estimate because a number of considerations qualify the im-
portance of effluent discharges. For example, in some parts of the country it
is more difficult for permittees to meet permit standards during the winter
months than from June to October, owing to decreased water levels in most
inland tributaries; effluent concentrations necessarily increase during such
times, although the actual amounts discharged remain static." 7 Many
NPDES permits take these seasonal changes into account, dictating relaxed
effluent limits during periods of low water flow.' 18
The Code of Federal Regulations requires that each regional office pro-
duce a quarterly noncompliance report (QNCR) which catalogues all in-
stances of NPDES violations by major effluent sources in the region. 1 9
Among the violations recorded in the QNCR are failures to submit DMRs,
submission of inadequate DMRs, failures of municipal entities to meet sec-
ondary treatment construction schedules, and deviations beyond effluent dis-
charge limitations. 120  The regulations, however, do not require the
publication of all discharge violations, only those violations that the permit-
tee has not remedied within forty five days from the DMR reporting date.'
2'
Under most NPDES permits, the reporting date is twenty eight days after
the end of each month. 122 Permittees, therefore, have approximately ten
weeks to correct discharge violations before risking publication. Some per-
mittees try to avoid publication of violations in the QNCR by a series of
excess discharges followed by corrective action within the forty-five day pe-
riod. To prevent these cyclical violations, the regulations also require the
publication of those violations which establish a pattern of noncompliance
over the most recent four-month reporting period.'
23
The availability of NPDES reports to private citizens is key to the effi-
Region III NPDES Permit Division in Philadelphia (Mar. 19, 1982) [hereinafter cited as
Hundertmark Interview].
117. Heenahan Interview, supra note 13. For an example of seasonal effects on effluent con-
centrations in tributaries receiving discharges, see Discharge Monitoring Reports of the Hershey
Chocolate Co., NPDES Permit No. Pa. 0008087 (Mar. 1982) (on file at the Denver Law Jour-
nal) (low seasonal flow creating temperature differentials of 10 degrees in excess of permitted
levels).
118. See, e.g., NPDES Permit of the City of St. Albans, NPDES Permit No. WV. 0023175,
EPA, Region III, Philadelphia, Pa. (variance of organic nitrogen and ammonia nitrogen levels
from June to October and November to May).
119. 40 C.F.R. § 122.18 (1982). EPA compiles a similar report on violations by non-major
permittees which is published annually. 40 C.F.R. § 122.18(c) (1982).
120. See, e.g., EPA Region III Quarterly Non-Compliance Report for Period Ending Sep-
tember 1981, EPA Region III, Philadelphia, Pa. (Dec. 1981) (on file at the Denver Law
Journal).
121. 40 C.F.R. § 122.18(a)(2)(A) (1982). In addition to using DMRs and QNCRS to deter-
mine NPDES permit violators, citizens can retrieve discharge information from the EPA by
filing a Freedom of Information Act request.
122. Pyzick Interview, supra note 108. See also NPDES Permit of Met Fin Co., NPDES
Permit No. WV 0004596, EPA, Region III, Philadelphia, Pa. (on file at the Denver Law
Journal).
123. 40 C.F.R. § 122.18(a)(2)(B) (1982).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
cient use of citizen suits to enforce water pollution laws. First, the reports
readily identify the sources of pollution, their locations, and the public wa-
ters affected by the effluent discharges.124 Second, the DMRs filed by per-
mittees clearly describe specific discharge activities.' 25 If a permittee is
exceeding his effluent limitations, one need only look to the results of the
permittee's monitoring tests to verify the violations. The DMRs provide the
EPA and private attorneys general with a primafacie case of illegal water
pollution activity against the NPDES violator.' 2 6 In addition, the quarterly
and annual noncompliance reports indicate which violations have been
targeted for compliance by informal or judicial administrative efforts.
Although the average QNCR in Region III contains more than 1500
discharge and reporting violations, 12 7 not all of the listed CWA violations are
appropriate for citizen enforcement suits. Where agency enforcement action
has commenced, private efforts would be duplicative. Moreover, many vio-
lations identified in the QNCR may not warrant the investment of litigation
resources; citizen suits for small, inconsistent violations lack cost effective-
ness. Thus, the dilemmas facing potential plaintiffs are numerous. If citi-
zens are to accept increased responsibility for the enforcement of the CWA
and other anti-pollution statutes in response to flagging EPA activities, a
coherent litigation strategy must be developed.
Because relatively few citizen enforcement suits have been brought di-
rectly against polluters, successful litigation strategies have not been devel-
oped. One alternative is to examine the EPA's exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in its case selection process. At a minimum, regional staff attor-
neys consider four factors to decide whether a violator should be prosecuted:
degree of excursion from stipulated discharge limits, time over which the
violations occurred, corrective action taken to bring the effluent source into
compliance with the permit, and future corrective measures planned.128
When evaluating degree of excursion from stipulated discharges, it is
difficult to determine when effluent discharges constitute a significant
enough excursion to support enforcement. Obviously, the limitations of the
permit delineate acceptable emission levels within the regulation. Small de-
viations from the limitations may or may not have a major impact on the
affected tributary. In addition, testing methods may provide ambivalent
data on discharges, such as a permittee who reports being within his permit-
ted maximum daily discharge, but far exceeds the allowable monthly dis-
charge standard. In such cases the agency often has been unwilling to
institute an administrative action;' 29 however, the violation could support a
private enforcement proceeding notwithstanding EPA's exercise of
prosecutorial discretion.
The duration of a violative practice may raise the significance of an
excursion to an actionable level. For example, a poultry processing plant
124. Set supra text accompanying note 116.
125. Id.
126. Heenahan Interview, supra note 13; Voltaggio Interview, supra note 38.
127. Hundertmark Interview, supra note 116.
128. Heenahan Interview, supra note 13.
129. 1d.
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exceeding its Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD) 130 daily maximum .limita-
tion for eighteen consecutive months indicates disregard for the statutory
requirements imposed by the CWA. The permittee may claim that his ex-
cursions are relatively small; but, if he fails to comply over a period of
months, the permittee is a good candidate for enforcement proceedings. In
contrast, many instances of noncompliance found in the QNCR are short
term excursions 31 caused by temporary equipment failures or seasonal vari-
ations, after which the permittee returns to compliant discharge levels.'
32
Because the statute does not provide citizens with a cause of action for past
violations, one-time or infrequent violators technically would not be valid
subjects for citizen actions. 133 Where it appears, however, that structural or
technical infirmities of a permittee's pollution control system create the ex-
pectation of future violations, equitable remedies allow suit for injunctive
relief, Expectations of continued excessive discharges must be measured by a
consistent pattern of past violations, over a minimum period of three or four
months.1 34 Examination of violators' DMRs would supply data to deter-
mine the duration of violations.
1 35
Citizens should avoid bringing suits against polluters who are in the
process of correcting problems in their discharge treatment equipment. This
suggestion does not indicate that violators are able to avoid enforcement by
promising corrective action when threatened with a suit, but rather that
those permittees making good faith efforts to comply with their permits are
not cost-effective subjects for citizen actions.
Since 1977, permittees under the CWA have been required to use the
Best Practical Technology (BPT) in their efforts to reduce effluent discharges
to acceptable levels. 136 Insuring that such technology is continually effective
presents a problem in a number of industries; constant repair and modifica-
tion is necessary to meet permitted discharge levels. During these repair pe-
riods, permittees report violations over which they exercise little control.
1 37
Some violations exceed permit limitations but, neverthelessare difficult
to enforce for policy or economic considerations. For example, a small com-
pany, which has conscientiously attempted to meet its NPDES discharge
standards, spends perhaps $2-3 million installing the Best Practical Technol-
ogy but discovers that the technology fails to perform as needed. The com-
pany remains in violation of its permit. Because of its substantial
expenditure on treatment equipment, the company rejects plans for correc-
tive action in the immediate future. This situation, considered in light of
130. The BOD level is a quantification of the amount of oxygen necessary to maintain the
ecological balance of the subject tributary. Se O'Leary v. Moyer's Landfill, Inc., 523 F. Supp.
at 653 n.22.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 119-22.
132. Dates on which a permittee returns to compliance prior to publication also appear in
the QNCR. 40 C.F.R. § 122.18(a)(1)(iv) (1982).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 48-54.
134. Heenahan Interview, supra note 13.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 115-17.
136. See, e.g., Pynsatuning Water Shed, 506 F. Supp. at 909.
137. See NPDES Permit for the City of St. Albans and Pursuant Correspondence, supra note
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EPA's case selection criteria, 138 presents a potential cause of action. The
likelihood that a court would grant any significant relief to claimants, how-
ever, is negligible. The company has, in fact, met its statutory burden of
fitting BPT equipment. Although the system failed to achieve acceptable
performance levels, the courts may deem equipment failure more a misfor-
tune of the marketplace than a situation of the company's inattention to
NPDES standards. 139 Consequently, private enforcement resources would
not be wisely spent bringing suit against the company unless the alleged
discharges had an environmental impact that overshadowed the benefits of
continued plant operation. In enacting the CWA, Congress theoretically
balanced these factors and decided that environmental protection was the
predominant consideration; however, practical aspects of the laws' applica-
tion will probably lead courts to deny any major form of relief where no
immediate threat to public health exists.
Generally, municipal treatment facilities are good subjects for citizen
enforcement actions. The crunch in local public funds of the mid-1970's
caused many jurisdictions to become lax in the operation and maintenance
of their treatment facilities. Many localities have been unable to construct
water treatment facilities without the assistance of federal grant monies
available through the CWA. 14° Because of these difficulties the EPA has
been reluctant to initiate enforcement proceedings against jurisdictions that
have not acquired federal grants. Although fiscal incapacity to attain com-
pliance with NPDES standards is not a defense to a charge of failing to
install BPT treatment facilities, the factor effectively reduces the court's op-
tions to construct an appropriate remedy. For this reason, EPA suits have
focused on municipal violators that have the fiscal capacity to properly com-
ply with effluent guidelines, or have rejected available funds.1
4 1
A private enforcement group created with the intent to implement a
plan of action could be organized efficiently on a regional basis. First, re-
gional enforcement groups could confront environmental problems where
they frequently occur: at the interstate level. Local enforcement efforts
aimed at large local pollution sources may be sufficient to halt various imme-
diate point sources from further violations of the law, but fail to cleanup the
entire stream where discharges were attributable to out-of-state points of
emission. A regional structure also would effectively coordinate with EPA
regional reporting and administrative systems. Where federal or state au-
thorities in a region are active in cleaning up a particular water body, pri-
vate resources could be channeled to complement enforcement efforts.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
To predict the success of large-scale efforts to enforce anti-pollution laws
through a scheme of citizen suits would be highly speculative. The history of
citizen suits brought directly against polluters provides little indication of
138. Set supra text accompanying note 129.
139. Heenahan Interview, supra note 13.
140. 33 U.S.C. § 1256 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
141. Hundertmark Interview, supra note 116.
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how a continuous, organized program of litigation would fare as a public
interest enterprise. The stage is set for a systematic attempt to privately en-
force environmental statutes. The evolution of federal administrative ma-
chinery in support of those laws has created a store of discovery materials on
which citizens may draw to identify and assemble cases. This is the corner-
stone of any future private enforcement venture. The EPA reporting ma-
chinery facilitates selection of violations and significantly reduces the costs of
discovery. The judiciary seems favorably disposed to the award of attorneys
fees to plaintiffs bringing effective or useful citizen suits. Though it is impos-
sible to state with any certainty that courts will allow all plaintiffs the full
value of the fees and costs incurred in litigation, it is clear that courts are
currently more willing to make such awards than at any time in the past. As
a result, the financial deterrents are less threatening than in previous years.
These favorable mechanical factors create the opportunity for an effec-
tively organized and conducted private enforcement group to operate. As
federal enforcement efforts are directed away from the CAA and CWA, and
the degradation of the environment becomes an expanding threat, the use of
citizen suits to enforce anti-pollution laws becomes correspondingly more at-
tractive and feasible.
1983]

